The Interaction between Endogenous Fertility and Inequality in the Political Economy by Schaefer, Andreas
        
Citation for published version:
Schaefer, A 2005, 'The Interaction between Endogenous Fertility and Inequality in the Political Economy', The
Manchester School, vol. 73, no. 4, pp. 522-541. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2005.00457.x
DOI:
10.1111/j.1467-9957.2005.00457.x
Publication date:
2005
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 13. May. 2019
The Interaction between Endogenous Fertility
and Inequality in the Political Economy
Andreas Scha¨fer ∗
16th May 2005
Abstract
We simulate a two period OLG-model with heterogeneous agents. Par-
ents receive utility from the quantity and quality of their offspring. An
increase in the wage rate leads to higher opportunity costs of child-rearing
time, thus implying lower fertility and higher quality per child. This causes
intergenerational persistence in fertility decisions and wages. Controlling
for the initial distribution of wealth, we show that economic growth in-
creases inequality and fertility differentials. Furthermore, we endogenise
redistribution by implementing a median voter-system. Due to fertility dif-
ferentials, the median-voter moves from upper to lower income percentiles.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to examine the link between economic inequality,
fertility, and the redistribution of wealth. Recently, Doepke and de la Croix
(2003) have argued that it is essential for the understanding of the link between
inequality and growth to account for the fertility differentials between rich and
poor. Poor agents tend to have more children and invest less resources in their off-
spring than do rich households. Therefore, the poor population will grow faster
than its richer counterpart. We argue further that the emergence of fertility
differentials based on inequality also translates into increasing redistributional
pressure.
Even before Malthus, economists analysed the relationship between population
and economic growth, but it is only recently that fertility has been incorporated
into formal micro-founded growth models. The evolution of economies over most
of human history was marked by Malthusian stagnation, the so called offsetting
effect of population growth on resources per capita. During the course of indus-
trialisation, the developed countries of today escaped the Malthusian trap and
experienced an increase in the population and growth rates of income per capita.
The increasing role of human capital initiated a decline in population growth,
leading to a state of sustained economic growth. Existing literature considers the
decline in fertility to be an endogenous phenomenon and introduced the number
of children to the parental utility function (Becker (1960)). The first decision-
oriented macro models in this area are those from Barro and Becker (1988,1989),
and Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990). The latter has been criticized because
of its dependence on exogenous shocks (luck) to initiate a demographic transition
and because of its counterfactual results.1 First growth theories unifying the dif-
ferent phases of economic development with its interdependencies to population
growth were advanced by Galor and Weil (1999,2000). Another channel trigger-
ing the demographic transition was the increase in the opportunity costs of time
spent in child rearing (Galor and Weil (1996,1999)).2 If fertility is negatively
related to the wage rate and a high wage rate, in turn, is associated with a high
quality per child, it makes sense to analyse the latter within a macroeconomic
setting that includes income heterogeneity.
1The major criticism has been that the Malthusian steady state is lagging the main features
of a Malthusian trap and that the model is not able to replicate the characteristics of the
demographic transition that is, an increase in population growth, followed by a decline in
population growth. For more details, see Galor (2004).
2For empirical evidence, see Ko¨gel(2004).
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The questions of how inequality relates to economic growth and how growth re-
lates to inequality have a long tradition. In the following, we summarise the
research most important to this study. As it seems that recent findings provide
little support for the Kuznets curve stating that growth determines inequality
(Anhand and Kanbur (1993) and Deininger and Squire (1998)), the question
is how reversed causality relates inequality to growth.3 Forbes (2000) finds a
positive short and medium-term relationship between inequality and growth in
a country, whereas the coefficient becomes insignificant for long-run considera-
tions. This result, however, cannot be applied to very poor countries as they
were excluded from the data set Forbes used. Furthermore, her findings do not
contradict the theory that there exists a long-run negative relationship between
inequality and growth. In fact, most of the theoretical channels suggesting a neg-
ative relationship would have an effect only over longer periods of time (see Galor
and Zeira (1993) for capital market imperfection, and Alesina and Rodrik (1994),
Persson and Tabellini (1994), Perotti (1996) and Rodrik (1998) for political econ-
omy and social conflicts). As we will consider a two-period OLG-framework with
endogenous fertility and therefore a period-length between 30 and 40 years, we
derive definite implications for the long-run performance of an economy.
Although both Perotti (1996) and Barro (2000) find that demographic variables
are important for understanding the relationship between inequality and eco-
nomic growth, the demographic structure in terms of differential fertility has not
been considered by them. Recent research suggests that there is a positive cor-
relation between inequality and fertility differentials, which is measured by the
Total Fertility Rate by women’s years of education. Kremer and Chen (2000) find
that changing from a relatively equal country, such as Indonesia (Gini=0.32), to
a country with higher inequality, such as Brazil (Gini=0.545) would lead to an
increase in the fertility differential by 0.020. This result can be interpreted as
follows. Comparing two women with ten and zero years of schooling means that
the relation as to the expected number of children between both women is about
1.22 children higher in Brazil than in Indonesia.
De la Croix and Doepke (2003) close the link between inequality, fertility dif-
ferentials, and growth. They argue both theoretically and empirically that the
above mentioned positive correlation between inequality and fertility differentials
3Barro (2000) finds evidence for the Kusnetz curve; however his evidence is most likely based
on the presence of transition countries in the data set (Ferreira (1999)).
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translates into differentials in education between rich and poor, lowering average
education and slowing down growth. In their work, as well as in Dahan and
Tsiddon (1998) and Morand (1999), inequality is introduced by the initial distri-
bution of human capital. The steady state, however, is characterised by an equal
distribution of human capital.
Building on Scha¨fer (2003,2002) and similar to Galor and Zeira (1993), Galor
and Zang (1997), Persson and Tabellini (1994), and Benabou (1996), we argue
in this paper that the distribution of wealth in an economy is essential to overall
growth performance. In detail, we analyse a two period OLG-model with endoge-
nous labour supply. Parents receive utility from the quality and quantity of their
offspring. Whereas the link between the direction of intergenerational transfers
and the demographic transition is analysed in Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), we
show that the amount of wealth including human and physical capital bequeast-
hed to the next generation leads to an intergenerational persistence in wage rates
and fertility decisions. We find that growth is conducive to higher inequality and
higher fertility differentials. Higher initial inequality slows down growth and in-
creases transitory inequality, leading to redistributional pressure. Lastly, we close
the missing link between growth, inequality, fertility, and the political economy
by implementing a median voter system. Given the research results of Kremer
and Chen (2000) and de la Croix and Doepke (2003), we find that inequality is
not only harmful to growth but also leads to increasing redistributional pressure
during the transition to the steady state. Hence, due to differential fertility, the
median voter moves from upper to lower income percentiles and votes in favour of
more redistribution given his/her preferences for economic equality. If the median
voter prefers a relatively low tax-rate, then the redistribution of wealth in terms
of future opportunities is low and the subsequent growth rate is also low since
inequality is high. Contrary to existing literature, redistributional pressure does
not cease once the steady state is reached, and it is interacting with demographic
variables.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the set-up of the
model. Section 3 introduces heterogeneity to the model. In Section 4, we explore
the development of wealth distribution and Section 5 endogenises redistributional
policies by means of the median-voter system. There follows a conclusion in Sec-
tion 6.
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2 The Model
We consider an economy populated by a continuum of households, limiting our
analysis to two periods of life: childhood and adulthood. During childhood, each
child consumes a constant fraction z of the parental time budget, with nt−1,it
representing the number of children (quantity) and lt−1,it the household’s labour
supply. Normalising the total available time to one, the time budget constraint
reads:
znt−1t + l
t−1
t = 1.
4 (1)
Consequently, the decision of a household to have a certain number of children
runs analogously to the decision to be active in the labour market for a certain
amount of time. When adult individuals receive bequest xt−1t and derive utility
from their own number of children nt−1t , their own consumption c
t−1
t and x
t
t, with
xtt representing the amount of wealth bequeathed to the children (quality). The
overall fertility costs consist of opportunity costs in terms of foregone wage in-
come during child-rearing time wtzn
t−1
t and the amount of wealth bequeathed to
the offspring xt,it n
t−1,i
t .
5
For further interpretations, it is important to use a broad definition of capital x
that includes physical and human capital and thus education too. Therefore, the
amount of bequest x has to be interpreted as the sum of efforts undertaken by
parents to equip their offspring with quality in terms of future opportunities.
The production technology is common knowledge, so that each adult has access
to the following production technology:
yt−1t = B
(
xt−1t
)α (
lt−1t
)1−α
. (2)
In addition, each household is equipped with some non-labour income h, provided
exogenously.6
4Superscript t− 1 indicates the period of birth and the indexes of the current period.
5The latter is responsible for the convexity of the budget constraint that governs the quality-
quantity trade-off.
6h can be endogenised easily, for example by child or family allowances (see Scha¨fer (2004)).
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The optimisation problem of household i is given by
max
{nt−1,it ;xt,it ;ct−1,it }
ut−1,it = γ lnn
t−1,i
t + β lnx
t,i
t + φ ln c
t−1,i
t , (3)
subject to:
yt−1,it + h︸ ︷︷ ︸
It−1,it
= wt−1,it zn
t−1,i
t + c
t−1,i
t + n
t−1,i
t x
t,i
t , (4)
and 1 = znt−1,it + l
t−1,i
t , (5)
where yt−1,it =
∂yt−1,it
∂lt−1,it
lt−1,it +
∂yt−1,it
∂xt−1,it
xt−1,it . (6)
In equilibrium, factors are compensated according to their marginal products and
profits are zero:
∂yt−1,it
∂lt−1,it
= wt−1,it , (7)
∂yt−1,it
∂xt−1,it
= rt−1,it . (8)
Solving problem (3)-(5) leads to optimal decisions
ct−1,it =
φ
γ + φ
I t−1,it , (9)
nt−1,it =
γ − β
φ+ γ
I t−1,it
zwt−1,it
, (10)
xt,it =
β
γ − β zw
t−1,i
t , with γ > β. (11)
It is apparent from Eq.(10) and (11) that the model is characterised by a quality-
quantity trade-off between the number of children and the amount of wealth.
Parents of high wealth receive high wage incomes, have high opportunity costs of
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child rearing, and hence low fertility, and they leave a high amount of wealth to
their offspring. When their children are adult they will receive a high wage rate,
and choose low fertility and a high quality per child. This leads to an intergen-
erational persistence in fertility decisions and wealth.
If the initial value of x is smaller than its steady state value (x0 < x
∗), then
xtt
xt−1t−1
> 1 and the economy converges as a whole, with declining fertility and in-
creasing wages towards its steady state. The latter is characterised by constant
fertility and zero growth in per capita terms:
nt−1,it = n
∗ and xt,it = x
∗ ∀ t, i. (12)
If agents differ in their position in the wealth distribution, they will choose dif-
ferent levels of fertility and quality per child.
3 Heterogeneity in Terms of Wealth and Abili-
ties
In this section, we extend the basic framework introduced above by heterogeneity
and derive analytically the law of motion of the moments of wealth distribution
during the transition to the steady state.
We assume two sources of heterogeneity. Firstly, the initial distribution of wealth
in a society, for example, by way of norms concerning equal living standards, ac-
cess to education or any other asset that can be accumulated and is important
to production. For reasons of tractability and in accordance with empirical find-
ings, we follow the common assumption that wealth is log-normal distributed.7
The advantage of this specification is that the moments of wealth distribution
are described by µ and σ. Furthermore, for any log-normal distributed random
variable it must be true that the logarithm of this variable is normal distributed.
The initial distribution of wealth is therefore given by
7See, for example, Diaz-Gimenez et al. (1997).
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xit=0 ∼ LN
(
µxt=0, (σ
x
t=0)
2
)
, (13)
or equivalently
ln xit=0 ∼ N
(
µxt=0, (σ
x
t=0)
2
)
. (14)
Consequently, the distribution and its moments are described in full by µx and
σx, so that
E[xit=0] = exp
(
µxt=0 +
σx
2
t=0
2
)
, (15)
V ar[xit=0] = exp
(
2µxt=0 + σ
x2
t=0
) (
exp
(
σx
2
t=0
)
− 1
)
. (16)
Second, we allow for some social mobility (even in the steady state) by assuming
that intellectual ability ²i is log-normal distributed as well (Loury (1981)). Con-
trary to the distribution of wealth, the distribution of abilities does not change
over time
²t−1,it ∼ LN
(
µ², (σ²)2
)
, with µ² = 0 and σ² = const. ∀ t. (17)
Since abilities govern individual abilities in production, individual output is sub-
ject to
yt−1,it = ²
t−1,i
t B
(
xt−1,it
)α (
lt−1,it
)1−α
. (18)
Individual wealth develops according to (11) as
xt,it =
β
γ − β zw
t−1,i
t , (19)
with wt−1,it = (1− α)²t−1,it B(xt−1,it )α(lt−1,it )−α.
The amount of wealth received in period t is a function of the parental wage
rate, which, in turn, is a positive function of the wealth the parents received and
the parent’s intellectual ability. Substituting the wage rate in (19) and taking
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logarithms leads to
lnxt,it = C + ln ²
t−1,i
t + α lnx
t−1,i
t − α ln lt−1,it , (20)
with C ≡ ln
[
β
γ−β
]
+ ln z + lnB + ln(1− α).
Obviously, quality per child is governed by the parental ability term and their
endowment with wealth. As the ability shock translates into endogenous variables
of the model, the assumption of uncorrelated abilities over time is not as limiting
as it might appear. Parents of low ability will leave lower bequests. Therefore,
their children will perform worse, independent of their own ability.
Developing the expected value and the variance over Eq.(20) leads to two differ-
ence equations governing the development of the moments of wealth distribution
E[lnxt,it ] = µ
x
t+1 = lnC + αµ
x
t − αµlt, (21)
V ar[lnxt,it ] = (σ
x
t+1)
2 = (σ²)2 + α2
(
(σxt )
2 + (σlt)
2
)
. (22)
As labour supply and fertility are a function of individual wealth, µlt and σ
l
t can be
expressed as functions of µxt and σ
x
t . Defining ln lt = ln(1− znt(xt−1t )) ≡ g(xt−1t )
and developing a Taylor-series approximation yields:
E
[
ln lt−1,it
]
= E
[
g(x) + (x− x)g′(x) + 1
2
(x− x)2g′′(x)
]
. (23)
Using (23) and setting x = µxt leads to
E[ln lt] = µ
l
t = g(µ
x
t ) +
1
2
(σxt )
2g′′(µxt ), (24)
V ar[ln lt] = (σ
l
t)
2 = (g′(µxt ))
2(σxt )
2. (25)
The transition towards the steady state is entirely driven by the moments of
wealth distribution and the structural parameters of the model. An increase
in (σxt )
2 leads to an increase in wealth inequality, accelerated by an increase in
labour supply and fertility differentials. Hence, economic and demographic vari-
ables are interacting with each other.
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As the steady state is characterised by zero growth in per-capita terms, such that
E[xt−1,i∗t ] = E[x
t,i∗
t ] = E[x
∗], which implies that E[wt−2,i∗t−1 ] = E[w
t−1,i∗
t ] = E[w
∗]
and that E[nt−2,i∗t−1 ] = E[n
t−1,i∗
t ] = E[n
∗], any steady state is characterised by a
stationary distribution of wealth, so that µxt = µ
x
t−1 = µ
x∗ and (σxt )
2 = (σxt−1)
2 =
(σx
∗
)2. Consequently,
E[lnx∗] = µx
∗
= lnC + αµx
∗ − αµl∗ , (26)
V ar[lnx∗] = (σx
∗
)2 = (σ²)2 + α2
(
(σx
∗
)2 + (σl
∗
)2
)
, (27)
with E[ln l∗] = µl
∗
= g(µx
∗
) + 1
2
(σx
∗
)2g′′(µx
∗
),
and V ar[ln l∗] = (σl
∗
)2 = (g′(µx
∗
))2(σx
∗
)2.
4 Development of Wealth Distribution
In this section, the development of wealth distribution is analysed. In order to
run numerical experiments matching empirical features in industrialised coun-
tries, the set of parameters {α, β, γ, φ, z, B, h, σ²} has to be specified.8 We choose
a capital share α equal to 0.3. Empirical evidence suggests that the opportunity
cost of a child amounts to 15% of parents time endowment. Assuming that a
child lives with the parents 15 years (at least) and that the adult period lasts
for 30 years implies a value of z equal to 0.0775. φ is set to 2.1, B equals 12,
and we choose β = 0.1925 which implies an expenditure share close to 0.88 and
a log-run interest rate between three and four percent. The weight of fertility
in the parental utility function γ is set 0.2975, in order to guarantee long-run
fertility around the reproduction level.9 Non-labour market income h equals 3.5
and amounts to one third of the average long-run wage rate. Finally, we choose
σ² = 0.5 assuring that the long-run (average) fertility differential remains in the
intervall between 0.4 and 1.5.10
We first conduct an ’empirical’ experiment by generating an artificial sample of
households, whether the log-normality of wealth distribution is maintained dur-
ing the transition process or not. In a second step, we simulate the development
8Furthermore, the choice of parameters is closely related to De la Croix and Doepke
(2003,2004).
9Fertility rates in most industrialised countries are around the reproduction level and long-
run projections, for example by the United Nations predict a stable population in the long-run.
10The results presented below are for reasonable parameter values robust.
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Figure 1: Dynamics of wealth distribution within an artificial sample for µxt=0 =
0.2, σxt=0 = 0.4 and N=1000.
of theoretical wealth distribution as it can be expected by the considerations
above. Since we consider agents who differ in their innate abilities and in their
factor endowments, the first period of the economy (t = 0) is characterised by the
initial parameters of wealth distribution µxt=0 and σ
x
t=0 determining the amount
of inequality in the economy, and the set of parameters.
Given the set of parameters, thousand artificial households are generated by
drawing a stochastic vector ~²t=0 = [²
i=1
t=0, ..., ²
i=1000
t=0 ]
′ from the log-normal distribu-
tion, satisfying Eq.(17). The endowment vector of the initial period is generated
similarly, such that ~xt=0 = [x
i=1
t=0, ..., x
i=1000
t=0 ]
′, given µt=0 = 0.2 and σt=0 = 0.4.
Each of the thousand agents takes the decisions according to the underlying op-
timisation problem, which is known and the same for all of them. Solving this
11
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Figure 2: Dynamics of wealth distribution f(x) for µxt=0 = 0.2, σ
x
t=0 = 0.4.
problem leads to the set of optimal decisions of the sample, especially fertility
decisions nit=0 and optimal choices for bequests x
i
t=0. The two latter ones consti-
tute the endowment vector ~xt=1.
In order to take account of the different fertility decisions, each element i of ~xt=1
is weighted by the relative fertility of household i with respect to the mean of
the economy. At the end of period one, the working generation dies and their
children enter the labour market, equipped with some xit=1 ∈ ~xt=1. Given the
endogenously determined vector ~xt=1, the amount of inequality for period one is
given as well, so that the loop starts again by generating a new stochastic ability
vector ~²t=1. The procedure of this loop continues until the distribution of wealth
in this artificial sample becomes stationary.
The histograms are shown in Figure 1. Apparently, the characteristics of a
log-normal distribution are preserved during the transition to the steady state,
whereas the steady state itself is characterised by a stationary distribution.
In order to examine the interaction between inequality, fertility, and growth, we
now explore the theoretically derived dynamics given by the set of difference
12
Parameter: µxt=0 = 0.2 and σ
x
t=0 = 0.4
t E[xt−1t ] V ar[x
t−1
t ] E[l
t−1
t ] V ar[l
t−1
t ]
µxt+1
µx
t
µxt σ
x
t µ
l
t (σ
l
t)
2
1 1.3231 0.3037 0.8887 0.2668 10−3 - 0.2 0.4 -0.1180 0.3377 10−3
2 1.4985 0.6797 0.8950 0.2002 10−3 1.3615 0.2723 0.5142 -0.1110 0.2499 10−3
3 1.5354 0.7425 0.8978 0.1753 10−3 1.0719 0.2918 0.5232 -0.1088 0.2175 10−3
4 1.5436 0.7531 0.8987 0.1655 10−3 1.0168 0.2968 0.5240 -0.1068 0.2048 10−3
.. ..... ...... ..... ...... ...... ..... ..... ..... .....
19 1.5463 0.7561 0.8988 0.1648 10−3 1 0.2985 0.5241 -0.1067 0.2040 10−3
20 1.5463 0.7561 0.8988 0.1648 10−3 1 0.2985 0.5241 -0.1067 0.2040 10−3
Table 1: Dynamics of average wealth E[xt−1t ] and labour supply E[l
t−1
t ], respective
variances, and moments of respective distributions for µxt=0 = 0.2 and σ
x
t=0 = 0.4
Parameter: µxt=0 = 0.2 and σ
x
t=0 = 0.55
t E[xt−1t ] V ar[x
t−1
t ] E[l
t−1
t ] V ar[l
t−1
t ]
µxt+1
µx
t
µxt σ
x
t µ
l
t (σ
l
t)
2
1 1.4208 0.7131 0.8699 0.4834 10−3 - 0.2 0.55 -0.1395 0.6384 10−3
2 1.5180 0.7363 0.8654 0.2091 10−3 1.3938 0.2787 0.5265 -0.1105 0.2483 10−3
3 1.5390 0.7496 0.8978 0.1815 10−3 1.0534 0.2936 0.5243 -0.1078 0.2127 10−3
4 1.5445 0.7544 0.8985 0.1660 10−3 1.0125 0.2973 0.5242 -0.1071 0.2056 10−3
.. ..... ...... ..... ...... ...... ...... ..... ..... .....
19 1.5463 0.7561 0.8986 0.1648 10−3 1 0.2985 0.5241 -0.1067 0.2040 10−3
20 1.5463 0.7561 0.8986 0.1648 10−3 1 0.2985 0.5241 -0.1067 0.2040 10−3
Table 2: Dynamics of average wealth E[xt−1t ] and labour supply E[l
t−1
t ], respective
variances, and moments of respective distributions for µxt=0 = 0.2 and σ
x
t=0 = 0.55
equations (21) and (22). Furthermore, we distinguish two scenarios that have
different degrees of inequality:
1. xit=0 ∼ LN(µxt=0 = 0.2; σxt=0 = 0.4),
2. xit=0 ∼ LN(µxt=0 = 0.2; σxt=0 = 0.55).
The simulation results are shown in Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 2.
Economies with different degrees of initial inequality but identical parameters
converge to the same steady state. Obviously, the initial distribution of wealth
has, everything else being equal, ’only’ transitory effects.
The results of the numerical simulation presented in Tables 1 and 2 and plot-
ted in Figure 2 reveal that growth leads to a higher expected value of wealth
E[xt−1,it ] and also to higher inequality (V ar[x
t−1,i
t ] is increasing). This is due to
the fact that, given the degree of inequality, households are endowed with dif-
ferent abilities ²t−1,it and wealth x
t−1,i
t determining their respective wage rates
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wt−1,it . As x
t−1,i
t is increasing ∀ i during the transition to the steady state (see
Eq.(19)), labour supply increases and fertility declines. Consequently, the ex-
pected value of wealth must increase. Independently of the initial amount of
inequality, households are getting wealthier (on average) during the transition to
the steady state. However, as the model exhibits an intergenerational persistence
in wage rates, fertility decisions, and quality (wealth) per child, inequality is also
increasing. Poor households will invest less in their children and exhibit higher
fertility. Their children, in turn, will receive a relatively low wage income, due
to a relatively low amount of x and so on. Consequently, poor households will
do worse than richer ones with the same ability. However, as the expected value
of x is increasing and agents are getting richer, the distance between rich and
poor is increasing, too. Furthermore, it becomes apparent from comparing Table
1 with Table 2 that the described effects are increasing in strength with rising
initial inequality.
A relatively equal initial distribution of wealth leads to relatively high wage rates
for all households and therefore to relatively high labour supply, with a fast
decline in fertility and an expected high growth rate.
Eq.(10) and (11) show that the amount of wealth translates into fertility de-
cisions. Therefore, inequality in wealth must also lead to inequality in labour
supply and fertility, and hence in fertility differentials. As the scenario presented
in Table 2 is characterized by higher initial inequality, the variance of labour
supply V ar[lt−1,it ] is higher, too during the transition. This implies also higher
fertility differentials due to the intergenerational persistence mentioned above.
As wealth (inequality) is an endogenous variable, variations in the initial amount
of inequality can only have transitory effects. Economies with different initial
conditions are converging, with everything else being equal, to the same steady
state.
We can summarise these results as follows:
1. Growth leads to a higher expected value of wealth, as well as higher vari-
ance; thus inequality increases.
2. During the transition, higher initial inequality raises both the expected
value and variance of x.
3. During the transition, higher initial inequality lowers the expected value of
labour supply and increases its variance, hence fertility differentials rise.
4. The more equal the initial distribution, the higher is the expected growth
rate.
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It follows that the inequality rising (transitory) effect of growth is weakened
by an initial distribution of wealth that is more equal. Growth leads to higher
labour supply, declining fertility, and decreasing fertility differentials. This means
that in the earlier stages of economic development, lower income percentiles have
a higher fertility than the upper ones when controlling for initial inequality.
Faster growth caused by a more equal initial distribution leads to a higher growth
rate of labour market participation and a faster decline in fertility.
These results correspond to the increasing arm of the Kuznets curve, as higher
growth leads to rising inequality and higher fertility differentials when control-
ling for the initial wealth distribution. If this is the case, higher inequality and
higher fertility for lower income percentiles should translate into redistributional
pressure. Therefore, it seems to be very unlikely that an economy converges
as described to its steady state. One should expect that growth and increasing
social pressure leads to the redistribution of widely defined capital and opportuni-
ties. A norm of justice in wealth redistribution could be that people of the same
innate abilities can engage in the same venture, independent of his/her social
background.11 The effects of wealth redistribution are examined in the following
section.
5 Endogenous Redistribution
In this section, we seek to analyse the effects of wealth redistribution when the
amount of redistribution is endogenised by a majority-voting system. Note here
that redistribution takes place before entering the labour force and not after pro-
duction. An after-production tax would reverse the outcomes. Such a redistrib-
ution scheme would increase the non-labor market income for transfer-receiving
households and lower the opportunity costs of child-rearing time for the con-
tributing households. Fertility would increase economy-wide and growth would
slow down because of lower wealth or quality per adult.12
We assume instead that wealth is redistributed before entering the labour force,
according to the following tax scheme (Benabou (1996)):
xˆt−1,it = (x
t−1,i
t )
1−τ (x˜t)τ , (28)
11For a similar argumentation, see Galor and Zeira (1993). We prescind from the existence of
a capital market and consider the non-existence of a capital market as a limiting case of capital
market discrimination.
12For the consequences of labour taxation, see Scha¨fer (2004).
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where xˆt−1,it represents after-tax wealth, x˜
t−1,i
t break-even wealth and 0 < τ < 1
the tax rate. Obviously, the tax scheme is progressive. Households with wealth
lower than x˜ have a higher after-tax wealth, and the opposite is true for the richer
ones:
xˆt−1,it > x
t−1,i
t ∀ {xt−1,it |xt−1,it < x˜t}, (29)
xˆt−1,it < x
t−1,i
t ∀ {xt−1,it |xt−1,it > x˜t}. (30)
Given, that d = xt−1,it − xˆt−1,it represents the net-transfer received or contributed
to according to Eq.(28), it has to be taken into account that net-transfers sum
up to zero in each period:
∫ Nt
0
xt−1,it − xˆt−1,it dxi = 0. (31)
Equation (28) and (31) determine the budget constraint for wealth redistribution
which is binding as we do not consider intertemporal debt policies. It follows that
the expected value of after-tax wealth equals the expected value of pre-tax wealth,
∫ Nt
0
xt−1,it f (x
t−1,i
t ) dx
i = x˜τt
∫ Nt
0
(xt−1,it )
1−τ f ((xt−1,it )
1−τ ) dxi, (32)
and (xt−1,it )
1−τ ∼ LN
(
(1− τ)µxt , (1− τ)2(σxt )2
)
. (33)
In light of (28) and (33) it follows that
ln
[
exp
(
µxt +
(σxt )
2
2
)]
(34)
= τ ln x˜t + ln
[
exp
(
(1− τ)µxt +
(1− τ)2(σxt )2
2
)]
.
Hence, the break-even wealth that satisfies the budget constraint is given by the
following relation:
ln x˜t = µ
x
t +
1
τ
[
1− (1− τ)2
] (σxt )2
2
. (35)
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With everything else being constant, a higher tax rate implies a lower break-even
wealth (differentiating (35) with respect to τ leads to ∂ ln x˜t
∂τ
= −τ 2 < 0), and to
a higher redistribution concentrating on the lower income percentiles.
Each household formulates a voting function, given optimal choices for fertility
nt−1,it , quality x
t−1,i
t , consumption c
t−1,i
t , and the break-even wealth x˜t:
V it = γ lnn
t−1,i
t + β lnx
t,i
t + φ ln c
t−1,i
t +Υ ln x˜t. (36)
The last term in the voting function therefore captures the individual preferences
for redistribution and hence the tolerated amount of inequality. For break-even
wealth, the following relationships must hold (see Eqs.(35) and (28)):
ln x˜t = µ
x
t +
1
τt
[
1− (1− τt)2
] (σxt )2
2
(37)
and
ln x˜t =
1
τt
[
ln xˆt−1,it − (1− τt) ln xt−1,it
]
. (38)
As stated above, break-even wealth is declining in the tax rate and increasing
in the degree of inequality. The second equation (see Eq.(38)) captures a rather
egoistic behaviour, in the sense that each individual tries to maximize the dis-
tance between pre and after-tax wealth, so that each individual seeks to set a
tax rate that increases his or her after-tax wealth. Therefore, a low weight Υ of
x˜t reflects a preference for low distance between xˆ
t−1,i
t and x
t−1,i
t , hence less self-
ishness, and a relatively high preference for a lower σxt associated with a higher
tax rate. Alternatively, Υ can be interpreted as voting-power. A high Υ would
represent a system which is more biased towards the rich.
In a majority-voting system, we assume that the median-voter is decisive for the
size of the tax-rate. Although this is the common assumption in the literature of
income distribution, one should take into consideration that this is only true if
political power is independent of economic power. Despite the fact that rich as
well as poor people have only one vote, the rich have greater resources available to
organise and articulate their preferences. In addition the electoral participation
of poor people, by contrast, might be lower, due to a lower level of education.
Therefore, any majority-voting system might be more biased towards the rich.
However, the interval around the median definitively serves as a point of refer-
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ence, as it represents more than fifty percent of the population.13
The moments of wealth distribution are known, so that the pre-tax wealth of the
median is known, too:
xt−1,medt = exp(µ
x
t ). (39)
Consequently, the after-tax wealth of the median is given by
xˆt−1,medt = (exp(µ
x
t ))
1−τt(x˜t)τt , (40)
implying a median after-tax income of
yˆt−1,medt = wˆ
t−1,med
t l
t−1,med
t + rˆ
t−1,med
t xˆ
t−1,med
t . (41)
Plugging (41) together with the set of optimal decisions (Eqs. (9)-(11)) into
Eq.(36), we obtain the voting function of the median voter V medt (τ
med
t ). Forming
the first-order condition
∂Vmedt (τ
med
t )
∂τmedt
= 0 (and
∂2Vmedt (τ
med
t )
∂τmed
2
t
< 0) leads, together
with Eq.(10) to a system of equations with τmedt and n
t−1,med
t as unknowns. Solv-
ing this system of equations leads to the preferred tax rate in period t:
τt = τ
med
t . (42)
With the tax rate known, the break even wealth x˜t is also known given the mo-
ments of wealth distribution. Consequently, the economy develops according to
E[lnxt−1,it ] = µ
x
t+1 = lnC + αµ
x
t + α
[
1− (1− τmedt )2
] (σxt )2
2
−αµlt, (43)
and
V ar[lnxt−1,it ] = (σ
x
t+1)
2 = (σ²)2 + α2
(
(1− τmedt )2(σxt )2 + (σlt)2
)
. (44)
13For an exogenous approach of biased democracies, see Benabou (1996); for an endogenous
approach, see Bourguignon and Verdier (2000).
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Figure 3: Secenario I: Different Initial Distributions; Identical Preferences for
Redistribution
In order to explore the effects of inequality in a median-voter system, we sim-
ulate two scenarios. Scenario I (see Figure 3) is characterised by different initial
degrees of inequality (σt=0 = 0.4 and σt=0 = 0.55). The preference for redistrib-
ution, however, is identical. The second scenario (see Figure 4) is characterised
by the same initial degree of inequality, and this time the preferences for redis-
tribution (Υ = 0.95 and Υ = 0.85) are different.
As can be clearly seen from the simulations performed in Scenario I, an increase
in inequality leads to higher variance in wealth. The mean is richer, therefore the
labour supply of the mean is higher, too, and its fertility lower, but the distance
between mean and median has also increased. Despite an increase in average
wealth and lower fertility of persons with average wealth, the variances for both
wealth and labour supply are higher. Higher labour supply differentials imply
higher fertility differentials and therefore faster population growth in the lower
income percentiles. As the household of average wealth does not coincide with
the population’s average, a higher distance between the median and the mean
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Figure 4: Scenario II: Identical Initial Distributions of Wealth; Different Prefer-
ences for Redistribution
leads to a higher tax rate and a lower break-even wealth. With the same parame-
ter constellation, the long-run characteristics of Scenario I are entirely the same.
In Scenario II, we seek to explore the effects of different preferences for redistri-
bution. These not only affect the transitory but also the long-run characteristics
of the economy. With a lower tax rate, the mean is poorer and the variance of
wealth is increasing. A higher amount of inequality translates into higher labour
supply and fertility differentials. Due to diminishing returns to wealth in the
production function, a higher amount of inequality lowers the growth rate of the
economy during the transition to the steady state. By contrast, a higher amount
of redistribution lowers fertility differentials and redistributes wealth to house-
holds with higher returns. Consequently, the growth rate is higher. Here it is
once again important to remember that this scenario considers a pre-production
tax. The implementation of an after-production tax would be harmful to growth.
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We can summarise the results of this subsection as follows
1. As economic growth increases inequality, the difference between the mean
and median of wealth distribution is increasing. Consequently, the median-
voter opts for an increasing tax rate during the transition to the steady
state.
2. The size of the tax rate and hence the amount of wealth redistribution
depends on preferences for equality in the economy, and specifically the
preferences of the median-voter.
3. A lower preference for equality implies a lower tax rate during all periods.
The preference for redistribution, therefore, translates not only into the
transitory but also into the long-run characteristics of the economy.
4. A lower preference for equality leads to higher transitory and long-run in-
equality and fertility differentials.
During the transition, the median-voter becomes increasingly poorer due to ris-
ing fertility differentials. As a consequence, the tax rate is increasing during the
transition; the more it does so, the more unequal is the wealth distribution and
the higher is the preference for equality.
Contrary to existing literature, redistributional pressure does not cease once the
steady state is reached, and it is interacting with demographic variables.
6 Conclusion
Using empirical findings, we have shown that fertility declines as economic de-
velopment progresses and that fertility interacts with wealth distribution.
Growth by itself leads to higher inequality and rising fertility differentials. This
gives rise to redistributional pressure during the process of economic develop-
ment. In terms of wealth redistribution, once a redistributional policy is applied,
the average economic growth rate increases.
In a median-voter system, the preferred tax-rate and the transitory as well as the
limiting distribution depend on the preference for redistribution, and hence for
societal equality. During the transition, the median-voter becomes increasingly
poorer due to rising fertility differentials. The more unequal the wealth distri-
bution is and the higher the preference for equality is, the more is the tax rate
21
increasing during the transition. Contrary to existing literature, redistributional
pressure is interacting with demographic variables and does not cease once the
steady state is reached.
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